Shaping Tomorrow: Youth Voices on Democracy, Engagement, and Mobility in Southeast Europe
Introduction
The political landscape of Southeast Europe is at a critical juncture, with the region's youth playing a pivotal role in shaping its future. This comprehensive analysis, based on the FES Youth Study Southeast Europe 2024, explores the attitudes and behaviors of young people aged 14-29 across 12 countries in the region. By examining their views on democracy, political participation, and emigration, we uncover a nuanced picture of a generation grappling with the challenges of political transition, economic opportunity, and national identity.
Our findings reveal a complex tapestry of youth perspectives, characterized by a general support for democratic principles tempered by openness to authoritarian alternatives, varying levels of political engagement across genders, and a significant inclination towards emigration. These insights offer valuable guidance for policymakers, educators, and civil society leaders working to strengthen democratic institutions, increase youth political participation, and address the root causes of youth emigration in Southeast Europe.
We invite readers to explore the interactive charts throughout this article. Many of these visualizations offer filtering options, allowing for a deeper dive into specific countries, genders, or political orientations. This interactivity provides an opportunity to uncover nuances and patterns that may be particularly relevant to your area of interest or expertise.
1. Democracy vs. Authoritarianism in Southeast Europe
The survey data reveals a complex landscape of democratic attitudes among Southeast European youth, characterized by a general support for democracy tempered by a concerning openness to authoritarian alternatives. While a majority of young people across the region agree that democracy is a good form of government, there is significant variation in the strength of this conviction. Countries like Albania, Kosovo, Greece, and Turkiye demonstrate robust support for democratic principles, with over 60% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that democracy is "under all circumstances preferable to any other kind of government". However, this support coexists with a troubling receptiveness to authoritarian governance in several countries. A substantial minority in most countries in the analysis – sometimes exceeding 25% – agree that dictatorship can be preferable under certain circumstances or express support for strong leaders who bypass parliamentary processes. This paradoxical combination of democratic approval and authoritarian acceptance suggests a fragility in democratic convictions that could be exploited by populist or autocratic movements.
Gender emerges as a significant factor in shaping democratic attitudes, with young women generally displaying stronger and more consistent support for democratic principles compared to their male counterparts. This gender gap is particularly pronounced in responses to questions about the consistency of democratic preference and the appeal of strong, extra-parliamentary leadership. The tendency for young men to be more open to authoritarian alternatives points to a potential vulnerability in the region's democratic fabric, especially given the historical precedent of male-dominated autocratic regimes. These gender disparities underscore the need for targeted civic education and engagement strategies that address the specific concerns and perspectives of young men and women separately. Moreover, the variation in democratic attitudes both between and within countries highlights the importance of nuanced, context-specific approaches to strengthening democratic institutions and values in Southeast Europe.
2. Authoritarianism and Euroskepticism
The data reveals a complex and varied relationship between Euroskepticism and authoritarian attitudes among youth in Southeast Europe. When considering the preference for dictatorship under certain circumstances, the association with Euroskepticism is inconsistent across countries. In some nations, such as Slovenia, Greece, and Romania, Euroskeptic youth show a higher tendency towards accepting dictatorship. However, in countries like Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro, Euroskeptic respondents actually demonstrate less openness to dictatorship than their Pro-EU counterparts. This suggests that Euroskepticism in the region is not uniformly linked to authoritarian leanings regarding governmental systems.
When examining attitudes towards strong leadership without parliamentary oversight, the pattern remains similar. Overall, Euroskepticism tends to be more strongly associated with authoritarian attitudes in countries that are EU members, such as Slovenia, Greece, and Romania, while this association is weaker or even reversed in non-EU member states. For instance, in North Macedonia and Montenegro, Euroskeptic youth show less preference for strong leadership compared to their Pro-EU counterparts. Kosovo demonstrates almost no difference between Euroskeptic and Pro-EU youth on both scales. These findings underscore the need for nuanced, country-specific approaches when addressing issues of democratic consolidation and EU integration in Southeast Europe, as the interplay between Euroskepticism and authoritarian tendencies varies significantly across the region and appears to be influenced by EU membership status.
3. Bridging the Gap: Diverse Paths to Political Participation
Analysis of youth political engagement in Southeast Europe reveals significant gender differences in specific areas of participation, though these differences are not uniform across all countries or types of activities. The most consistent gender disparities are observed in volunteering or civil society activities and in working with political parties or groups. In seven out of twelve countries studied, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Greece, there are significant gender differences in participation or willingness to participate in volunteer or civil society activities. Similarly, seven countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, show significant gender differences in involvement or potential involvement with political parties or groups. Young men are more likely to engage in this form of political participation than women. These findings suggest that young men and women in the region often gravitate towards different channels for their political engagement.
Interestingly, other forms of political participation show fewer gender disparities across the region. Activities such as signing petitions or engaging in online political activities show no significant gender differences. This suggests that these forms of engagement appeal similarly to young men and women, both in terms of actual participation and willingness to participate. These findings highlight the complex nature of youth political engagement in Southeast Europe, where gender disparities are evident in some areas but not others. They underscore the importance of recognizing diverse forms of political participation and understanding that while young men and women may be drawn to different types of organizational political activities, they share common ground in many forms of individual political expression and activism.
4. Young People's Representation in Politics and Their Decision to Vote
Analysis of youth perceptions of political representation and voting behavior in Southeast Europe reveals a concerning trend of perceived underrepresentation among young people, regardless of their voting status. Across the region, a majority of youth feel either "Not at all" or "Poorly" represented in national politics, with these two categories often exceeding 50% of responses. This sentiment is particularly strong among those who had the right to vote but chose not to, suggesting a possible link between perceived lack of representation and political disengagement. Notably, very few young people – typically less than 5% in most countries – feel "Very well" represented, indicating a widespread disconnect between youth interests and national political agendas.
However, the data also reveals a nuanced relationship between voting behavior and perceived representation. In most countries, there is a significant association between these factors, with those who voted generally perceiving better representation than non-voters who had the right to vote. This suggests that political participation might positively influence perceptions of representation, or conversely, that feeling better represented might encourage voting. Interestingly, those who didn't have the right to vote show more varied perceptions of representation, possibly reflecting their diverse experiences with political engagement outside of voting. These findings underscore the importance of addressing youth representation in Southeast European politics, as the perceived lack of representation could potentially lead to long-term political disengagement among a significant portion of the youth population.
5. Youth Flight: Over 1 in 4 Young People Strongly Consider Emigration
The analysis of youth emigration desires in Southeast Europe reveals a concerning trend, with a substantial proportion of young people expressing a strong or very strong desire to leave their home countries. Across the region, an average of 27.91% of youth indicate a high inclination towards emigration, though this figure varies significantly between countries. North Macedonia stands out with the highest proportion at 42.67%, followed closely by Albania (36.95%) and Turkey (35.93%). On the other end of the spectrum, Bulgaria (18.31%) and Romania (18.85%) show the lowest proportions of youth with strong emigration desires. This wide range suggests that country-specific factors, such as economic opportunities, political stability, and social conditions, play crucial roles in shaping young people's emigration intentions.
Notably, there appears to be a general trend where EU member states, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia, tend to have lower proportions of youth expressing strong emigration desires, with Greece being an exception at 31.26%. In contrast, non-EU countries in the Western Balkans, such as North Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, show higher percentages of youth considering emigration. This pattern might reflect perceived differences in opportunities and living standards between EU and non-EU countries in the region. However, the consistently high percentages across the board - with seven out of twelve countries having over 25% of their youth strongly considering emigration - indicate a region-wide challenge of youth retention. This trend could have profound implications for the demographic structure, economic development, and social fabric of these nations in the coming decades, highlighting the urgent need for policies that address the root causes of youth dissatisfaction and create compelling reasons for young people to build their futures in their home countries.
6. Economic Factors Dominate Youth Emigration Motives in Southeast Europe
Analysis of emigration motives among Southeast European youth reveals a stark emphasis on economic factors, with over two-thirds (67.13%) of respondents citing reasons directly related to financial and professional advancement. The desire for an improved standard of living stands out as the primary motivation, accounting for 27.78% of responses, closely followed by the prospect of higher salaries at 23.33%. Better employment possibilities (11.44%) and enhanced opportunities for education (7.39%) round out the top economic drivers. These findings underscore a pervasive perception among the region's youth that their home countries are falling short in providing adequate economic opportunities and living standards, prompting them to look abroad for a more prosperous future.
Interestingly, while economic factors dominate across genders, there are notable differences in emigration motives between young men and women. Women show a slightly stronger inclination towards improving their standard of living (29.97% compared to 25.42% for men) and place greater emphasis on educational opportunities (8.46% vs 6.28% for men). In contrast, men express more concern about corruption and clientelism in their home countries, with 7.32% citing this as a primary reason for wanting to emigrate, compared to only 4.33% of women. Cultural factors also play a more significant role for women, with "Experiencing a different culture" appearing in their top five reasons for emigration.
7. Political Extremes and Gender Nuances Shape Youth Emigration Desires
Analysis of emigration intent among Southeastern European youth reveals a complex interplay between gender and political orientation. Overall, a significant portion of young people express a desire to leave their home countries, with 27.84% indicating a strong or very strong intention to emigrate, and an additional 30.24% reporting moderate emigration intentions. Gender differences, while subtle, are notable: females show a slightly higher propensity for strong emigration intent (28.20%) compared to males (27.46%), yet paradoxically, they are also more likely to have no intention of emigrating (26.14% vs 23.38% for males). This suggests that young women in the region have more polarized views on emigration, either strongly considering it or firmly deciding against it.
Political orientation emerges as a significant factor influencing emigration intentions, with those at the extremes of the political spectrum showing the highest desire to leave. Far-left respondents exhibit the strongest emigration intent, with 36.94% expressing strong or very strong desires to emigrate, closely followed by far-right respondents at 29.90%. In contrast, those identifying with centrist or moderate right-wing views demonstrate lower levels of strong emigration intent (26.16% and 23.43% respectively). This pattern suggests that dissatisfaction with the current political and social climate may be a driving force behind emigration desires, particularly for those with more extreme political leanings. Interestingly, across all political orientations, a substantial portion of youth (25-32%) express moderate emigration intentions, indicating a large segment of the population that could potentially be swayed by changing circumstances or targeted policies aimed at retaining young talent.
8. Circular Migration: Shifting Trends in Youth's Long-Term Emigration Desires
The comparison of youth emigration intentions between 2018 and 2024 reveals significant shifts in the desire for permanent relocation across Southeast Europe. This data on circular migration provides valuable insights into the changing perceptions and aspirations of young people in the region over a six-year period. Notably, several countries have seen substantial decreases in the percentage of youth expressing a desire to emigrate "for good". Albania experienced the most dramatic drop, from 44.48% in 2018 to 32.58% in 2024. Similarly, Kosovo saw a decrease from 41.68% to 32.33%, and Montenegro showed a significant reduction from 26.80% to 14.08%. These substantial decreases could indicate improving conditions or changing perspectives on opportunities within these countries.
Conversely, some countries have experienced increases in youth desiring permanent emigration. North Macedonia stands out with a notable rise from 33.77% in 2018 to 45.09% in 2024, now having the highest percentage among all countries in the 2024 survey. Bulgaria and Romania saw slight increases, while other countries like Croatia and Slovenia experienced minor decreases. This divergence in trends across the region underscores the complex and dynamic nature of factors influencing youth emigration desires. The overall picture suggests a nuanced landscape of changing youth aspirations, with some countries potentially making progress in retaining young talent, while others face growing challenges in this area.
Conclusion
As Southeast Europe continues to navigate its path towards democratic consolidation and economic development, the voices and choices of its youth will be instrumental in shaping the region's future. By understanding and addressing the complex factors influencing youth attitudes towards democracy, political participation, and emigration, policymakers and civil society leaders can work towards creating a more inclusive, prosperous, and democratically robust Southeast Europe.
